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PURCHASING HEALTH? THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE 
Kristen Underhill*  
The 2010s have been a momentous decade for Medicaid. With 
enrollment of over seventy-two million people (19% of the country’s 
population), Medicaid is the nation’s largest public health insurance 
program,1 and it is the primary or sole source of health insurance for 
vulnerable groups such as low-income children and pregnant women, 
adults with disabilities, and people in need of long-term care.2 Since 
2014, the pendulum of Medicaid policy has swung from an unprece-
dented expansion of coverage under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
toward more recent federal regulations and state policy innovations that 
are instead predicted to limit uptake of benefits. 
These developments have raised questions about the purposes and 
scope of the Medicaid program, which are central to ongoing litigation 
over state Medicaid waivers. Under § 1115 of the Social Security Act, 
states can seek approval from the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) to implement demonstration projects in Medicaid pro-
gramming.3 States have previously used this waiver pathway to expand 
coverage and benefits, to incorporate incentives for healthy behaviors, to 
charge copayments and premiums, and to make delivery system modifica-
tions.4 Beginning in 2018, however, HHS has approved numerous state 
                                                                                                                           
 * Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Associate Professor of 
Population & Family Health, Mailman School of Public Health. With colleagues from the 
Perelman Medical School and Wharton Business School at the University of Pennsylvania, 
I am coprincipal investigator of the independent evaluation of Kentucky’s § 1115 
Medicaid program, which includes work requirements. The evaluation, which is separate 
from this Piece, is funded by Kentucky via a combination of state and Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) funds. No funding source had any role in the 
preparation of this Piece. I am grateful to Michelle Silva and the editors of the Columbia 
Law Review for helpful feedback and suggestions. 
 1. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., July 2019 Medicaid & CHIP  
Enrollment Data Highlights, Medicaid.gov, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/
program-information/medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-data/report-highlights/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZV8L-FUXQ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (Supp. V 2017) (defining mandatory popula-
tions for Medicaid coverage). 
 3. Social Security Act § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012) (explaining requirements for 
waivers of state plans based on “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project[s]”). 
 4. See Elizabeth Hinton, MaryBeth Musumeci, Robin Rudowitz, Larisa Antonisse & 
Cornelia Hall, Kaiser Family Found., Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: The 
Current Landscape of Approved and Pending Waivers app. A (2019), https://
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demonstration projects that make eligibility for some beneficiaries 
contingent on work requirements: the completion of monthly quotas of 
work, education, or volunteering hours to stay on Medicaid.5 Although 
work requirements have long been a prerequisite for accessing federal 
cash welfare6 and nutritional assistance,7 their use in Medicaid is a 
historic first.8 
Program beneficiaries have challenged HHS’s approvals, alleging in 
part that work requirement waivers are unlikely to advance the purposes 
of the Medicaid program.9 As a result, these cases squarely ask the court 
to identify Medicaid’s purposes. Although the statute specifies that the 
program aims to “furnish medical assistance,” HHS has proffered other 
goals, including the promotion of public health. Thus far, the District of 
D.C. has relied on the narrower interpretation to strike down waivers in 
Kentucky,10 Arkansas,11 and New Hampshire,12 finding that the Secretary 
did not adequately consider whether work requirement waivers are likely 
                                                                                                                           
www.kff.org/report-section/section-1115-medicaid-demonstration-waivers-the-current-
landscape-of-approved-and-pending-waivers-appendices [https://perma.cc/BNC3-T3BA]; 
Laura Hermer, On the Expansion of “Welfare” and “Health” Under Medicaid, 9 St. Louis 
U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 235, 237–41 (2016). 
 5. The first such waiver was in Kentucky; HHS subsequently approved work 
requirement waivers in Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, 
Ohio, and Utah. See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 
Waivers by State, Kaiser Family Found. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/
issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-approved-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-
state/#Table2 [https://perma.cc/D8ST-4SC2] [hereinafter Kaiser Family Found., 
Medicaid Waiver Tracker]. 
 6. See Heather Hahn, David Kassabian & Sheila Zedlewski, Urban Institute, TANF 
Work Requirements and State Strategies to Fulfill Them 2 (2012), https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/work_requirements_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ET6Q-E9QT] (describing work requirements in the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families program, which were established at the program’s inception 
in 1996 and modified by subsequent legislation including the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009). 
 7. See Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs), Food & Nutrition Serv., 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/ABAWD [https://perma.cc/KX6X-
2VVZ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (describing work requirements for able-bodied adults 
without dependents using the Supplementary Nutritional Assistance Program). 
 8. Lola Fadulu, Why States Want Certain Americans to Work for Medicaid, Atlantic 
(Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/arcarch/2019/04/medicaid-work-
requirements-seema-verma-cms/587026/ [https://perma.cc/7CW4-AZJJ]; Hinton et al., 
supra note 4, at 1 (“In January 2018, CMS posted new guidance to allow state Section 1115 
waiver proposals to condition Medicaid on meeting a work requirement and subsequently 
has approved the first waivers of that type in the history of the Medicaid program.”). 
 9. See Philbrick v. Azar, No. 19-773 (JEB), 2019 WL 3414376, at *1 (D.D.C. July 29, 
2019); Stewart v. Azar (Stewart II), 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 145 (D.D.C. 2019); Gresham v. 
Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019); Stewart v. Azar (Stewart I), 313 F. Supp. 3d 237 
(D.D.C. 2018). 
 10. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 125; Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 237. 
 11. See Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 179. 
 12. See Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *11. 
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to advance the standalone goal of furnishing medical assistance. These 
decisions have explicitly found that promoting public health is not a 
freestanding purpose of Medicaid programming.13 
The stakes of this interpretive choice are greater than the fate of 
work requirements. An enormous body of literature in public health 
documents the influence of social determinants of health: the broad 
conditions of poverty, social inclusion, housing, nutrition, neighborhood 
safety, discrimination, instability, economic opportunity, and education 
that shape health outcomes.14 Indeed, these risk and protective factors 
may account for a far greater share of our morbidity and mortality than 
access to medical care.15 In recent years, states have begun to test 
pathways to use federal and state Medicaid funds to intervene in these 
determinants, and they have often done so by waiver. Using mechanisms 
such as § 1115 programming and incentives for Medicaid managed care 
organizations, states have found creative ways to address risk and 
protective factors beyond the doctor’s office, including paying for 
improvements in housing, nutrition, and linkages to social services.16 
These programs may be more tenuous, however, if health promotion is 
excluded from the reading of Medicaid’s purposes. On this interpre-
tation, state Medicaid waivers may hold only if they advance the provision 
of medical assistance, which may trade off against using program resour-
ces to address upstream determinants of health. 
                                                                                                                           
 13. See, e.g., id. (reiterating that the court “has found that health is not a 
freestanding objective of the Medicaid Act”); Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 145 (“[T]he 
Court finds that health is not a freestanding objective of the statute.”); Gresham, 363 F. 
Supp. 3d at 179 (citing the findings from Stewart I that “the agency’s ‘focus on health is no 
substitute for considering Medicaid’s central concern: covering health costs’” and that 
“HHS has offered no argument here that calls those conclusions into question”). 
 14. See Sandro Galea, Melissa Tracy, Katherine J. Hoggatt, Charles DiMaggio & 
Adam Karpati, Estimated Deaths Attributable to Social Factors in the United States, 101 
Am. J. Pub. Health 1456, 1456, 1461–62 (2011) (calculating relative risks, prevalence, and 
estimated deaths resulting from factors such as low educational attainment levels, racial 
segregation, low social support, individual-level poverty, income inequality, and area-level 
inequality); U.S. Burden of Disease Collaborators, The State of US Health, 1990–2016: 
Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Among US States, 319 JAMA 1444, 1444, 
1451 (2018) (reporting trends on leading risk factors for death and disease); Samantha 
Artiga & Elizabeth Hinton, Beyond Health Care: The Role of Social Determinants in 
Promoting Health and Health Equity, Kaiser Family Found. (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/beyond-health-care-the-role-of-social-
determinants-in-promoting-health-and-health-equity/ [https://perma.cc/Y8XG-RZH5] 
(providing an overview of social factors that contribute to disparate health outcomes and 
surveying existing federal, state, and nongovernmental initiatives that seek to address 
them). 
 15. See Steven A. Schroeder, We Can Do Better—Improving the Health of the 
American People, 357 New Eng. J. Med. 1221, 1221 (2007) (arguing that “the pathways to 
better health do not generally depend on better health care” but rather on addressing 
nonbehavioral determinants of health). 
 16. See infra Part I. 
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This Piece argues that a narrow construction of Medicaid’s purposes 
may have unanticipated consequences for future Medicaid waivers, 
inadvertently limiting the long-term capacity of Medicaid programming 
to address social and structural influences on health. The promise of 
public insurance programs like Medicaid for intervening in these deter-
minants is already bounded by available funds, political will, and the 
limits of federal versus state power in a jointly administered program. But 
judicial precedents disallowing health promotion as a goal of Medicaid 
programming may compound these barriers, further complicating efforts 
to leverage Medicaid to alleviate structural risks. 
This Piece considers tradeoffs in setting the scope of Medicaid and 
other public health insurance programs. Using public health insurance 
to purchase health, and not just medical assistance, may require a funda-
mental reconceptualization of programs like Medicaid and Medicare. 
This Piece begins with a brief overview of social determinants of health 
and ways in which states have begun to address these influences through 
Medicaid waiver programming. Subsequent sections will consider work 
requirement waivers and ongoing litigation parsing the purposes of the 
Medicaid statute. Concluding remarks will consider whether public 
health insurance can and should serve as a vehicle for addressing social 
determinants of health. 
I. USING MEDICAID TO ADDRESS SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 
Over the past half-century, public health scholars have amassed 
extensive documentation of social and structural determinants of health.17 
These determinants are many but include factors such as affordable high-
quality housing; neighborhood factors such as violence, transportation, and 
walkability; social experiences such as discrimination, segregation, stress, 
and social support; socioeconomic status; education; employment oppor-
tunities; access to healthy food; and environmental hazards such as poor 
air quality and unsafe water.18 Together, these determinants are powerful 
influences on morbidity and mortality. A much-quoted analysis has esti-
mated that only 10% of health status is attributable to healthcare access, 
while 20% arises from social and environmental exposures, 30% from 
genetics, and 40% from behavior.19 When we consider that behavior is 
                                                                                                                           
 17. See generally World Health Org., Social Determinants of Health: The Solid Facts 
(Richard Wilkinson & Michael Marmot eds., 2d ed. 2003); Michael Marmot, Sharon Friel, 
Ruth Bell, Tanja A.J. Houweling & Sebastian Taylor, Closing the Gap in a Generation: 
Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health, 372 Lancet 1661 
(2008); Michael Marmot, Social Determinants of Health Inequalities, 365 Lancet 1099 
(2005); Sandra Putnam & Sandro Galea, Epidemiology and the Macrosocial Determinants 
of Health, 29 J. Pub. Health Pol’y 275 (2008). 
 18. See Paula Braveman, Susan Egerter & David R. Williams, The Social 
Determinants of Health: Coming of Age, 32 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 381, 384–89 (2011); 
Galea et al., supra note 14, at 1462–63; Artiga & Hinton, supra note 14, at 2. 
 19. Schroeder, supra note 15, at 1222. 
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also in part determined by exposure to social and structural risk factors,20 
the role of social determinants looms even larger. 
The failure to address many of these health determinants can help 
to explain what Elizabeth Bradley and Lauren Taylor have called the 
“American health care paradox”: How is it that we spend so much more 
on care but purchase health outcomes that are mediocre or worse than 
outcomes in comparably wealthy countries?21 As these authors and others 
have deduced, the paradox in large part derives from our failure to pay 
for “services that address the broader determinants of health.”22 These 
include improvements in “housing, nutrition, education, the environment 
and unemployment support,”23 among others. These services fall outside 
traditional conceptions of healthcare, and thus outside definitions of 
covered benefits for private and public health insurance. As Bradley and 
Taylor have argued: 
[Americans] continue to pay top dollar for hospitals, physicians, 
medications, and diagnostic testing yet skimp in broad areas 
that are central to health, such as housing, clean water, safe 
food, education, and other social services. It may even be that 
Americans are spending large sums for healthcare to 
compensate for what they are not paying in social services—and 
the trade-off is not good for the country’s health.24 
Expenditures on social determinants of health are not covered 
benefits for most healthcare payors; indeed, they fall well outside what is 
traditionally considered to be medical care. For both private policies and 
public insurance programs in the United States, coverage of services 
depends largely on whether the care is deemed medically necessary.25 
Contract terms limiting health insurance coverage to “medically necessary” 
care arose in private insurance plans after World War II, and Medicare 
took up the language in 1965.26 Medicare currently excludes coverage for 
                                                                                                                           
 20. See Paula Braveman & Laura Gottlieb, The Social Determinants of Health: It’s 
Time to Consider the Causes of the Causes, 129 Pub. Health Rep. 19, 22–24 (2014) 
(discussing research showing that exposure to social factors and stressors can influence 
behaviors that in turn influence health outcomes). 
 21. Elizabeth H. Bradley & Lauren A. Taylor, The American Health Care Paradox: 
Why Spending More Is Getting Us Less 2–3 (2013) (describing the “spend more, get less” 
paradox long studied in U.S. health policy). See generally Nat’l Research Council & Inst. 
of Med., U.S. Health in International Perspective: Shorter Lives, Poorer Health (Stephen 
H. Woolf & Laudan Aron eds., 2013) (comparing U.S. health outcomes against other 
high-income countries and finding a pattern of higher mortality and inferior health in 
nine categories). 
 22. Bradley & Taylor, supra note 21, at 3. 
 23. Id. at 12. 
 24. Id. at 15–16. 
 25. See Kristen Underhill, Paying for Prevention: Challenges to Health Insurance 
Coverage for Biomedical HIV Prevention in the United States, 38 Am. J.L. & Med. 607, 
647–49 (2012) (providing background on insurers’ reliance on medical necessity 
determinations). 
 26. Id. at 647. 
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any care that is “not reasonable and necessary” for diagnosis, treatment, 
prevention, and palliation.27 Medicaid benefits are defined more specifi-
cally by statute28 and set forth in detailed regulations by HHS,29 including 
categories such as inpatient hospital care, outpatient services, laboratory 
and imaging services, and “other diagnostic, screening, preventive, and 
rehabilitative services.”30 States must cover mandatory benefits but may 
also receive federal matching funds for optional benefits such as dental 
care and prescription coverage.31 For adults covered under the ACA 
Medicaid expansion, states must cover ten categories of care known as 
“essential health benefits”;32 these are the same categories of care that 
must be covered by private plans eligible for ACA tax subsidies,33 and 
they include care such as ambulatory patient services, emergency care, 
hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and sub-
stance use disorder services, and preventive and wellness services.34 
Given the definitions that structure mandatory benefits, essential 
health benefits, and medical necessity clauses, there may be little 
interpretive room to extend health insurance coverage to services such as 
housing subsidies, educational supports, and environmental improve-
ments. But in recent years, states have begun experimenting with 
Medicaid waiver programming to pay for interventions that improve social 
determinants of health. States have considered or used multiple mech-
anisms to achieve these goals, including § 1115 experimental waivers, a 
subset of § 1115 programs known as Delivery System Reform Incentive 
Payment (DSRIP) programs, and incentives for Medicaid managed care 
organizations.35 
                                                                                                                           
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A)–(E) (Supp. V 2017). 
 28. Id. § 1396d(a) (defining “medical assistance”). 
 29. 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.1–440.185 (2018) (defining mandatory Medicaid benefits). 
 30. See id. § 440.130; 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)–(3), (13); see also Mandatory & 
Optional Medicaid Benefits, Medicaid.gov, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/
benefits/list-of-benefits/index.html [https://perma.cc/J6EL-S534] (last visited Oct. 6, 
2019) (listing Medicaid benefits). 
 31. See Robin Rudowitz, Kendal Orgera & Elizabeth Hinton, Kaiser Family Found., 
Medicaid Financing: The Basics 1 (2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-
Medicaid-Financing-The-Basics [https://perma.cc/X62A-QLE8] (providing an overview of 
Medicaid financing). 
 32. See Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a)(2), 124 Stat. 271, 271–72 
(2010); see also id. § 1302, 124 Stat. at 163–68 (defining essential health benefits). 
 33. See Ian Spatz & Michael Kolber, The Future of Essential Health Benefits, Health 
Affairs (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170214.058765/
full/ [https://perma.cc/E3MG-LPU5] (describing how private plans interact with the 
ACA’s essential health benefits). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(A)–(J) (Supp. V 2017). 
 35. States may also address some social determinants of health for disabled 
populations in § 1915(c) waivers, which pay for home supports to enable in-home care for 
patients who would otherwise be institutionalized. See Home & Community-Based Services 
1915(c), Medicaid.gov, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/hcbs/authorities/1915-
c/index.html [https://perma.cc/CL49-APXE] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019); see also Deborah 
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A. § 1115 Waivers 
Under § 1115 of the Social Security Act, states can seek relief from 
certain federal requirements for a period of up to five years to 
implement experiments, pilots, or demonstrations in their Medicaid pro-
gramming.36 Waivers qualify for approval if the experimental program is 
“likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of the statute, with an 
additional agency requirement of being budget-neutral for the federal 
government.37 Although the language of § 1115 suggests time-limited and 
incremental experiments, these waivers have increasingly functioned as 
programmatic waivers, with “experimental” programs lasting decades.38 
The section of the Medicaid statute that outlines mandatory benefits is 
not part of the Secretary’s § 1115 waiver authority,39 so waiver programs 
cannot cover less than the mandatory set of services.40 But commentators 
have suggested that states can use § 1115 waivers to obtain Medicaid 
matching funds to cover more.41 
                                                                                                                           
Bachrach, Jocelyn Guyer & Ariel Levin, Milbank Mem’l Fund, Medicaid Coverage of Social 
Interventions: A Road Map for States 7–8 (2016), https://www.milbank.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/MMF-NYS-Health-Issue-Brief-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K48G-4M4Q] [hereinafter Bachrach et al., Road Map for States] 
(discussing § 1915(c) waivers). Section 1945(c)(1) also provides some leeway for 
mitigating social risks. The statute authorizes payments for health homes for people with 
chronic disease, which should include referrals to “community/social supports.” 
Medicaid.gov, Health Homes (1945 of SSA/ Section 2703 of ACA) Frequently Asked 
Questions Series II 4–5, 12 (2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/state-resource-center/
medicaid-state-technical-assistance/health-home-information-resource-
center/downloads/health-homes-section-2703-faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/CCM3-4HTY]. 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a), (e)(6). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 1315; see also Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the 
Light: Using Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s 
Medicaid Expansion, 15 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 213, 214 (2015) [hereinafter 
Watson, Black Box] (discussing Section 1115 waivers). Under current budget neutrality 
rules, the waiver must not increase costs to the federal government, relative to what the 
federal government would spend in ordinary Medicaid programming. See Letter from 
Timothy B. Hill, Acting Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. to State Medicaid Dirs. 
1–2 (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/
smd18009.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GJN-AHJ4] [hereinafter Hill, Budget Neutrality Policy 
Letter]. 
 38. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-18-249, Medicaid Demonstrations: 
Evaluations Yielded Limited Results, Underscoring Need for Changes to Federal Policies 
and Procedures 12 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689506.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DH2X-4L3B] (noting that some states have operated portions of their Medicaid program 
as demonstrations for decades); Watson, Black Box, supra note 37, at 215 (“Some waivers 
have continued for decades with no public evaluation of their impact on Medicaid access, 
cost, or quality.”). 
 39. See Watson, Black Box, supra note 37, at 225 (“[R]equests to reduce benefits 
implicate statutory provisions in Section 1937, and are therefore outside the Secretary’s 
Section 1115 authority to waive provisions in Section 190.”). 
 40. See id. 
 41. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: 
Understanding Medicaid’s Failure, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 705, 762–63 (2005) (“Through 
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Should states seek to use Medicaid funds to reduce social risks to 
health—such as, for example, by investing in neighborhood safety 
programs in areas with a high proportion of residents on Medicaid, or by 
subsidizing the purchase and storage of healthy food—approving this 
coverage by waiver is likely within the Secretary’s discretion. Waiver 
authority is broad and judged on an abuse of discretion standard, 
whereby waiver approvals are found to be arbitrary and capricious if “the 
agency ‘entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, 
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’”42 To justify the 
grant of a waiver, HHS must “examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.”43 These standards should 
be straightforward for § 1115 waivers seeking to finance interventions 
into social determinants of health. Epidemiological studies have 
documented the pathways between social risk factors and health 
outcomes, and evidence for interventions that address these risks is 
growing.44 Testing these interventions in Medicaid would be supportable 
by relevant data and seems to be a sound use of waiver authority. 
There are few other legal barriers to using § 1115 waivers to advance 
social interventions. Medicaid benefits are set forth at some length by 
statute, which may tend to imply that Congress deliberately excluded 
nonenumerated benefits from coverage;45 one covered category, however, 
consists of “any other medical care, and any other type of remedial care 
recognized under State law, specified by the Secretary.”46 If the Secretary 
wished to approve Medicaid waiver financing for innovative social 
interventions, HHS could make a colorable claim that waiver authority 
and the Secretary’s own judgments about covered care are sufficient. 
                                                                                                                           
Section 1115 waivers, states can move away from simple insurance expansions and may 
instead pursue social policies that appreciate the behavioral component of health care 
consumption.”). 
 42. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 135 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). 
 44. See, e.g., Clare Bambra, Marsha Gibson, Amanda Sowden, Kath Wright, Margaret 
Whitehead & Mark Petticrew, Tackling the Wider Social Determinants of Health and 
Health Inequalities: Evidence from Systematic Reviews, 64 J. Epidemiology Community 
Health 284, 285–90 (2010) (discussing research on interventions related to the social 
determinants of health); David R. Williams, Manuela V. Costa, Adebola O. Odunlami & 
Selina A. Mohammed, Moving Upstream: How Interventions that Address the Social 
Determinants of Health Can Improve Health and Reduce Disparities, 14 J. Pub. Health 
Mgmt. Prac. S8, S8–S14 (2008) (same). 
 45. This is known as the expressio unius canon of statutory interpretation, whereby a 
statute that expresses one thing is read to imply that other things are excluded. See 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and the Courtroom, 50 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 800, 805 & n.25 (1983). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(29) (Supp. V 2017). 
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Indeed, the statutory provision allowing for § 1115 waivers notes that the 
“costs of such project[s] which would not otherwise be a permissible use 
of funds . . . shall to the extent and for the period prescribed by the 
Secretary, be regarded as a permissible use of funds under such part.”47 
The stumbling block for such waivers is likely to be budget neutrality, but 
assuming some structural interventions are indeed cost-effective, § 1115 
waivers attempting to alleviate structural risk are legally feasible if they 
align with CMS’s priorities. 
To date, states have not made full use of § 1115 waiver proposals to 
address social determinants of health, despite calls to do so.48 Possible 
innovations under such waivers, however, are highly attractive. For 
example, surveys show a high prevalence of food insecurity in the 
Medicaid population, and SNAP benefits do not extend to everyone 
eligible for Medicaid.49 States might respond by seeking § 1115 approval 
to spend on the subsidization and storage of healthy food.50 Medicaid is 
an important support for people experiencing homelessness or unsafe 
housing; perhaps states might adopt “housing first” models that spend 
on supportive services, or they may seek to defray the costs of mold 
remediation or lead paint abatement.51 At the neighborhood level, 
Medicaid might also pay for housing inspectors or remediation teams. 
For individuals living with energy insecurity, and who are exposed to 
extremes of heat and cold in their homes—exacerbating problems of 
asthma, stress, and poor mental health52—another possible use of § 1115 
                                                                                                                           
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
 48. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 41, at 762–64 (encouraging the use of Section 
1115 waivers by states); Bachrach et al., Road Map for States, supra note 35, at 7–8. 
 49. See, e.g., Am. Heart Ass’n, Policy Position Statement: Expanding Access to 
Healthy Food for Medicaid Beneficiaries 2, 5 (2019), https://www.heart.org/-/media/
files/about-us/policy-research/policy-positions/access-to-healthy-food/expanding-access-
to-healthy-food-for-medicaid-beneficiaries–policy-statement-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EJ4S-LHGT]; see also Deborah Bachrach, Jocelyn Guyer, Sarah Meier, John Meerschaert 
& Shelly Brandel, Enabling Sustainable Investment in Social Interventions: A Review of 
Medicaid Managed Care Rate-Setting Tools 3 (2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/
sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_fund_report_2018_jan_bachrach_
investment_social_interventions_medicaid_rate_setting.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM94-UCAV] 
[hereinafter Bachrach et al., Enabling Sustainable Investment] (noting that although 
about 70% of adults eligible for Medicaid in expansion states are below the federal poverty 
level, only about half receive SNAP benefits). 
 50. See Bachrach et al., Enabling Sustainable Investment, supra note 49, at 8 
(outlining states’ options for using § 1115 waivers to use Medicaid strategies to invest in 
social interventions that might offer help with, among other things, food assistance). 
 51. See Amanda Cassidy, Medicaid and Permanent Supportive Housing 3 (2016), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20161014.734003/full/healthpolicybrief_
164.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (identifying “a variety of strategies on how 
states can use Medicaid funding to support individuals who are or have been homeless and 
emphasize options for covering housing-related services under Medicaid”). 
 52. See Diana Hernández, Understanding ‘Energy Insecurity’ and Why It Matters to 
Health, Soc. Sci. & Med., Oct. 2016, at 6 (reporting study results demonstrating the 
negative health consequences of home energy insecurity). 
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programming could spend Medicaid funds to supplement assistance 
from the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP).53 
Coverage of GEDs, childcare assistance, and transportation subsidies may 
also pay off in long-term health improvements. Oregon, for example, 
implements Medicaid through contracts to organizations that function as 
both insurers and providers, and the program serves the goal of 
“addressing the social determinants of health” by directly covering 
“community-level interventions” and services such as housing.54 
This style of waiver might also move the focus from individuals to 
communities, funding interventions at the community level rather than 
services for individuals. Consider the Michigan effort to address harms 
inflicted by the lead contamination crisis in Flint. Michigan recently 
sought a § 1115 waiver to expand Medicaid eligibility for people who 
were exposed to the Flint water supply, up to 400% of the federal poverty 
level (FPL).55 But instead of paying for medical care, it may have been a 
better use of funds to pay for earlier action that would have mitigated or 
prevented the contamination. In cities or communities with high pro-
portions of Medicaid beneficiaries, Medicaid funds could purchase 
outsize returns in public health by detecting and reducing water contam-
ination by lead, hazardous chemicals, or bacteria.56 Similarly, funds could 
be directed to other neighborhood-level hazards, such as violence pre-
vention or the construction of safe spaces for physical activity and social 
interaction.57 
One objection to waivers in this style is that they lead to positive 
externalities that cannot be recaptured by the Medicaid program. For 
example, intervening at the neighborhood level to promote social 
inclusion and prevent violence may have benefits for residents who are 
                                                                                                                           
 53. LIHEAP Fact Sheet, Office of Cmty. Servs. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/ocs/programs/liheap/about [https://perma.cc/83SF-27LX] (noting that 
the objective of LIHEAP is “[t]o assist households with low incomes, particularly those 
with the lowest incomes that pay a high proportion of household income for home energy, 
primarily in meeting their immediate home energy needs”). 
 54. See Bachrach et al., Enabling Sustainable Investment, supra note 49, at 9. 
 55. Michigan’s Medicaid Section 1115 Waiver to Address Effects of Lead Exposure in 
Flint, Kaiser Family Found. (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/
michigans-medicaid-section-1115-waiver-to-address-effects-of-lead-exposure-in-flint 
[https://perma.cc/6A8T-MHEF]. 
 56. See Bradley & Taylor, supra note 21, at 15 (noting that approximately 15% of the 
U.S. population in 2009 was exposed to contaminated drinking water). 
 57. See, e.g., Diana Hernández, Affording Housing at the Expense of Health: 
Exploring the Housing and Neighborhood Strategies of Poor Families, 37 J. Fam. Issues 
921, 922 (2016) (discussing violence-avoidance and coping strategies employed by low-
income families who confront housing and neighborhood hardships); Karyn A. Tappe, 
Karen Glanz, James F. Sallis, Chuan Zhou & Brian E. Saelens, Children’s Physical Activity 
and Parents’ Perception of the Neighborhood Environment: Neighborhood Impact on 
Kids Study, Int’l J. Behav. Nutrition & Physical Activity, Mar. 2013, at 7 (reporting a 
positive correlation between neighborhood safety from crime and children’s use of public 
recreation spaces). 
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not Medicaid beneficiaries. Assuming budget neutrality, however, positive 
externalities need not disqualify waivers from approval. Other provisions of 
the Medicaid statute, such as the requirement that state Medicaid 
programs pay hospitals Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) funds for 
uncompensated care burdens,58 or the section providing healthcare 
providers with high proportions of Medicaid caseloads with incentives to 
adopt electronic health records,59 have similar benefits for third parties. 
B. DSRIP Waivers 
Unlike direct programming—whereby states directly finance 
investments in social determinants of health—DSRIP waivers work by 
giving states money to incentivize activity by healthcare providers, 
typically hospitals.60 DSRIP programs are a subset of § 1115 waivers that 
have been in use since California first proposed one in 2010.61 The goal 
of DSRIP programs is to hold out Medicaid funds to incentivize providers 
to make improvements in healthcare delivery62 and population health;63 
about a dozen states have now implemented a program as part of a 
                                                                                                                           
 58. See Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments, Medicaid.gov, 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/finance/dsh/index.html [https://perma.cc/QG7G-
PBY3] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (“Federal law requires that state Medicaid programs make 
[DSH] payments to qualifying hospitals that serve a large number of Medicaid and 
uninsured individuals.” (emphasis added)). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 1903(a)(3)(F), (t) (Supp. V 2017); see also Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., Medicaid Electronic Health Record Incentive Payments for Eligible 
Professionals 1 (2013), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/
EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/MLN_MedicaidEHRProgram_TipSheet_EP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DB7D-47MA] (describing the Medicaid Electronic Health Record 
(EHR) Incentive Program, which “provides incentive payments for Medicaid eligible 
professionals (EPs) who adopt, implement, upgrade, or meaningfully use certified EHR 
technology”); Federal Match Rates for Medicaid Administrative Activities, Medicaid & 
CHIP Payment & Access Comm’n, https://www.macpac.gov/federal-match-rates-for-
medicaid-administrative-activities/ [https://perma.cc/8M5Q-XFRT] (last visited Oct. 4, 
2019) (compiling federal compensation schedules for various Medicaid activities). 
 60. See Michael K. Gusmano & Frank J. Thompson, Medicaid Delivery System 
Reform Incentive Payments: Where Do We Stand? Health Aff.: Blog (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180920.103967/full 
[https://perma.cc/DYD2-J37G] [hereinafter Gusmano & Thompson, Where Do We 
Stand?]. 
 61. Alexandra Gates, Robin Rudowitz & Jocelyn Guyer, An Overview of Delivery 
System Reform Incentive Payment (DSRIP) Waivers 3 (2014), http://files.kff.org/
attachment/an-overview-of-dsrip [https://perma.cc/P8JD-TDGZ]. 
 62. Felicia Heider, Tina Kartika & Jill Rosenthal, Nat’l Acad. for State Health Policy, 
Exploration of the Evolving Federal and State Promise of Delivery System Reform 
Incentive Payment (DSRIP) and Similar Programs 5 (2017), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Exploration-of-the-Evolving-Promise-of-DSRIP-and-Similar-
Programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YFS-CWV5]. 
 63. See Gates et al., supra note 61, at 3 (“At the highest level, DSRIP waivers are 
designed to advance the ‘Triple Aim’ of improving the health of the population, 
enhancing the experience and outcomes of the patient and reducing the per capita cost of 
care.”). 
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§ 1115 waiver.64 Payments to providers under these programs are tied to 
specific milestones, which can include health outcomes.65 States like New 
Jersey and Kansas, for example, have offered providers incentives to 
reduce diabetes complications, post-surgical complications, and emer-
gency department visits.66 In California, DSRIP programming provides 
incentives for hospitals to improve health outcomes, with a particular 
focus on sepsis infections and conditions including HIV and asthma.67 
New York’s program incentivizes providers to address substance use 
prevention and mental health, along with projects focusing on HIV, 
cardiovascular health, perinatal health, diabetes, palliative care, asthma, 
renal care, and care for women and children.68 
New York’s program also involves the work of a governmental task 
force, the Medicaid Redesign Team, which coordinated the use of state 
Medicaid funds to provide supportive housing for 4,500 beneficiaries at 
high risk for homelessness and poor health outcomes.69 In 2012 and 
2013 respectively, the state budget allocated $75 million and $86 million 
in state (not federal) Medicaid funds to purchase housing for bene-
ficiaries with especially high healthcare costs.70 As the project leaders 
wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine, “We envision a Medicaid 
system in which spending on social determinants of health is not only 
allowable, but recognized as a best practice.”71 
CMS has not approved a new DSRIP program since the change of 
administration and in 2018 directed Texas to prepare a phase-out plan to 
develop delivery system reforms without DSRIP funding.72 But the 
                                                                                                                           
 64. See Medicaid & CHIP Payment & Access Comm’n, Delivery System Reform 
Incentive Payment Programs 1 (2018), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2018/03/Delivery-System-Reform-Incentive-Payment-Programs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MGG7-KVAE] [hereinafter MACPAC, Delivery System Reform]; 
Gusmano & Thompson, Where Do We Stand?, supra note 60. 
 65. Medicaid & CHIP Payment & Access Comm’n, Delivery System Reform, supra 
note 64, at 5. 
 66. See Michael K. Gusmano & Frank J. Thompson, An Examination of Medicaid 
Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment Initiatives Under Way in Six States, 34 Health 
Aff. 1162, 1165–66 (2015). 
 67. See Gates et al., supra note 61, at 6. 
 68. Id. at 7. 
 69. See Kelly M. Doran, Elizabeth J. Misa & Nirav R. Shah, Housing as Health Care—
New York’s Boundary-Crossing Experiment, 369 New Eng. J. Med. 2374, 2374–75 (2013). 
 70. Id. at 2375. 
 71. Id. at 2376. 
 72. See Eliot Fishman, Sinsi Hernández-Cancio & Ellen Albritton, Families USA, 
Financial Support for Safety Net and Small Community Providers to Participate in Delivery 
System Reform: Medicaid-Based Options for States 2 (2018) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); Tex. Health & Human Servs., Draft Delivery System Reform Incentive  
Payment (DSRIP) Transition Plan 2–3 (2019), https://hhs.texas.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/laws-regulations/policies-rules/1115-waiver/waiver-renewal/draft-dsrip-
transition-plan-cms.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB7H-99HX] (describing the mandate to 
develop a transition plan to phase out DSRIP funding); Letter from Angela D. Garner, 
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viability of population health efforts under the DSRIP program is an 
intriguing proof of concept for waivers that seek to address social 
determinants of health, and future administrations may revive the DSRIP 
tool for this purpose. 
C. Medicaid Managed Care Organization (MCO) Incentives 
Like DSRIP waivers, managed care contracts offer another means of 
promoting health indirectly, namely by incentivizing managed care 
organizations to take on projects that address social determinants.73 
Many states operate Medicaid through managed care organizations—
insurance companies that are paid a per-patient (capitated) rate to 
provide coverage for Medicaid benefits.74 Managed care organizations 
have incentives under capitated rates to cover any care that is cost 
effective, which might include services such as supportive housing for 
beneficiaries most at risk.75 As Deborah Bachrach and colleagues have 
noted, “While states cannot direct plans to invest in non-Medicaid social 
supports, they can indirectly encourage such investments by linking 
incentive and withhold payments to outcomes that can be improved by 
offering social supports.”76 A number of states—including at least 
Colorado, Michigan, Maine, and California—have made use of this 
strategy, often encouraging managed care contractors to provide case 
management services that connect beneficiaries to social supports and 
help to navigate public assistance for housing, energy, and other needs.77 
In one example, a Medicaid managed care organization in Minnesota 
                                                                                                                           
Dir., Div. of Sys. Reform Demonstrations, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to 
Stephanie Muth, Assoc. Comm’r, Medicaid/CHIP, Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n 
41 (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/tx/tx-healthcare-transformation-ca.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/47MC-YB9E] (specifying the end of DSRIP funding). 
 73. See Bachrach et al., Enabling Sustainable Investment, supra note 49, at 6 (“States 
can elect to use incentive payments to reward plans that perform well on quality metrics 
related to social issues and/or that make use of value-based payments.”); see also Bachrach 
et al., Road Map for States, supra note 35, at 8 (“MCOs may determine to cover additional 
social services—i.e., those not covered under the MCO contract—in order to reduce the 
cost and improve the quality of care.”). 
 74. Bachrach et al., Road Map for States, supra note 35, at 8. 
 75. See id. at 8, 11–13 (describing the use of Medicaid MCO contracts to incentivize 
improvements in housing for covered beneficiaries and summarizing examples in various 
states); see also Bachrach et al., Enabling Sustainable Investment, supra note 49, at 7 
(describing Arizona’s practice of making state housing grants available to regional 
behavioral health authorities, and requiring those regional authorities to reinvest 6% of 
their profits in community projects like food banks or housing). 
 76. Bachrach et al., Enabling Sustainable Investment, supra note 49, at 11. 
 77. Bachrach et al., Road Map for States, supra note 35, at 9–10. 
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achieved a 9% reduction in emergency department visits by connecting 
patients with housing specialists.78 
These three pathways—§ 1115 waivers, DSRIP programming, and 
managed care incentives—are all means through which states are already 
exploring uses of the Medicaid program to address social determinants 
of health. But ongoing litigation shaping the purposes of the Medicaid 
statute may affect states’ enthusiasm for these types of creative programs. 
This litigation arises from the use of work requirement waivers, to which 
this Piece now turns. 
II. WORK REQUIREMENT WAIVERS 
The prior Part described ways in which states have considered using 
Medicaid to address social determinants of health. In approving recent § 
1115 waivers, CMS has characterized work as a determinant of health and 
has conceptualized work requirement waivers as an effort to shape labor 
force participation. This section describes the course of work require-
ment waivers that led to the emerging set of federal court decisions inter-
preting Medicaid’s statutory purpose. 
Over the past two administrations, federal Medicaid policy has 
vacillated between two poles. In 2010, a crucial provision of the Affordable 
Care Act sought to extend coverage to adults with incomes below 138% of 
the federal poverty level, including adults lacking traditional plus-factors 
such as disability or pregnancy.79 Congress enforced this directive the 
same way it had enforced all prior Medicaid expansions: States that 
                                                                                                                           
 78. Dawn E. Alley, Chisara N. Asomugha, Patrick H. Conway & Darshak M. Sanghavi, 
Accountable Health Communities—Addressing Social Needs Through Medicare and 
Medicaid, 374 New Eng. J. Med. 8, 8 (2016). 
 79. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a), 124 
Stat. 119, 271 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (Supp. V 2017)) 
(expanding Medicaid eligibility to 133% FPL); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) 
(expanding Medicaid eligibility to adults under 65 years of age who are not pregnant). 
The text of the ACA sets the minimum FPL at 133%, but due to its new methodology of 
calculating income, the effective minimum eligibility threshold was actually raised to 
138%. ACA Frequently Asked Questions, Am. Pub. Health Assoc., https://www.apha.org/
topics-and-issues/health-reform/aca-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/V5YD-
Y495] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019). Prior to this expansion, Medicaid coverage had been 
reserved for those considered the “deserving” poor—women, children, blind people, 
disabled people, and poor elderly people. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & 
Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 13, 16 (2013) (denoting 
categories of people historically considered to be “deserving poor”). The concept of 
deserving poor also had a racial dimension, which factored into local control of Medicaid 
and other programs intended to provide relief for the poor. See Huberfeld et al., supra, at 
13 n.62; see also Jamila Michener, Fragmented Democracy: Medicaid, Federalism, and 
Unequal Politics 34–36 (2018). The ACA abolished these categories, extending coverage 
on the basis of income alone without requiring a plus-factor for eligibility. See Huberfeld 
et al., supra, at 25. 
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refused to expand the program would risk losing all Medicaid funds.80 
Two years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius elimi-
nated this penalty as coercive, rendering the expansion optional.81 With 
thirty-three states opting in since funds became available in 2014, the 
optional expansion yielded an increase of approximately twelve to 
thirteen million people insured through Medicaid.82 Medicaid thus 
accounts for a majority of the people who newly gained insurance under 
the ACA.83 This expansion, in turn, has led to improved access to 
healthcare, increased self-reported health, increased financial security, 
and financial gains for hospitals and clinics.84 Some commentators have 
even characterized expansion as a step toward Medicaid “universality”85—a 
shift away from formalized exclusions in healthcare on the basis of 
factors such as ability to pay, and toward a norm of inclusion verging on 
“outright solidarity” across eligible populations.86 Some states also 
capitalized on Medicaid expansion to increase flexibility via § 1115 waiver 
programming, securing new abilities to impose premiums,87 cost 
                                                                                                                           
 80. See Huberfeld et al., supra note 79, at 5–6 (“[T]he Court held that an existing 
statute, on the books for almost eight decades, constitutionally could not be applied to 
withhold states’ Medicaid funding for failing to implement the Medicaid expansion.”); see 
also id. at 21 (describing prior expansions of Medicaid, all enforced by the same provision 
that risked “all Medicaid funding for non-cooperating states”). 
 81. 567 U.S. 519, 585–86 (2012). 
 82. Medicaid Enrollment Changes Following the ACA, Medicaid & CHIP Payment & 
Access Comm’n, https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/medicaid-enrollment-changes-following-
the-aca [https://perma.cc/4XL4-6K54] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (finding an increase in 
Medicaid enrollment of 13.1 million people in expansion states); see also Bowen Garrett & 
Anuj Gangopadhyaya, Urban Inst., Who Gained Health Insurance Coverage Under the 
ACA, and Where Do They Live? 7 (2016) (finding that over nineteen million nonelderly 
people gained insurance from 2010 to 2015 and that about twelve million of these were in 
Medicaid expansion states). 
 83. Rachel Garfield, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, Kaiser Family Found., The 
Uninsured and the ACA: A Primer 7 (2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/The-
Uninsured-and-the-ACA-A-Primer-Key-Facts-about-Health-Insurance-and-the-Uninsured-
amidst-Changes-to-the-Affordable-Care-Act [https://perma.cc/Q75U-Q76K] (finding that 
nearly twenty million people gained insurance coverage after the ACA). 
 84. Lara Antonisse, Rachel Garfield, Robin Rudowitz & Madeline Guth, Kaiser Family 
Found., The Effects of Medicaid Expansion Under the ACA: Updated Findings  
from a Literature Review 1 (2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-brief-The-Effects-
of-Medicaid-Expansion-under-the-ACA-Findings-from-a-Literature-Review 
[https://perma.cc/PKM3-RRZU]; Olena Mazurenko, Casey P. Balio, Rajender Agarwal, 
Aaron E. Carroll & Nir Menachemi, The Effects of Medicaid Expansion Under the ACA: A 
Systematic Review, 37 Health Aff. 944, 946–48 (2018). 
 85. Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. 
& Ethics 67, 68 (2015). 
 86. Id. at 69. Despite this shift toward inclusivity, undocumented migrants continue 
to be excluded from Medicaid even in expansion states due to federal regulations 
restricting eligibility. Id. at 68 n.7. 
 87. See Watson, Black Box, supra note 37, at 213. 
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sharing,88 and stick-based personal responsibility conditions for accessing 
enhanced or optional benefits.89 
In 2017, however, the change in federal administration brought a 
change in emphasis for Medicaid policy. Federal regulation of Medicaid 
has mirrored a shift in broader administration goals, visible in new 
“public charge” regulations (that is, rules that consider Medicaid uptake 
as potentially disqualifying for citizenship and immigration determi-
nations),90 proposed rules that would eliminate federal oversight of state 
provider reimbursement levels,91 proposed rollbacks of nondiscrimination 
rules that had initially sought to protect patients on the basis of gender 
identity and sexual orientation,92 and the issuance of experimental state 
waivers that allow states to enforce new conditions on eligibility for adult 
beneficiaries deemed able-bodied.93 In late 2017, CMS issued new goals 
for Medicaid waivers, including “improv[ing] access to high-quality, 
person-centered services that produce positive health outcomes,” 
“ensur[ing] Medicaid’s sustainability,” and “address[ing] certain health 
determinants that promote upward mobility, greater independence, and 
improved quality of life.”94 
                                                                                                                           
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Susan McKernan, Elizabeth Momany, Aparna Ingleshwar, Padmaja 
Ayyagari, Astha Singhal, Dan Shane, Andrew Ghattas & Peter Damiano, Univ. of Iowa Pub. 
Policy Ctr., Access, Utilization, and Cost Outcomes: Iowa Dental Wellness Plan Evaluation 
2014–2016, at 6 (2017), http://ppc.uiowa.edu/sites/default/files/dwp_outcomes_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PBB5-L67K] (explaining a dental plan that rendered members who 
sought routine dental exams at regular intervals eligible for “additional covered services”); 
Tami Gurley-Calvez, Genevieve M. Kenney, Kosali I. Simon & Douglas Wissoker, Impacts 
on Emergency Department Visits from Personal Responsibility Provisions: Evidence from 
West Virginia’s Medicaid Redesign, 51 Health Serv. Res. 1424, 1426–27 (2016) (describing 
a health plan that would provide participants with “more comprehensive benefits” if they 
agreed to “certain program rules” designed to reduce costs and improve health behavior); 
Brad Wright, Natoshia M. Askelson, Monica Ahrens, Elizabeth Momany, Suzanne Bentler 
& Peter Damiano, Completion of Requirements in Iowa’s Medicaid Expansion Premium 
Disincentive Program, 2014–2015, 108 Am. J. Pub. Health 219, 219 (2018) (evaluating 
rates of member compliance with Iowa’s Medicaid expansion premium disincentive 
program). 
 90. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,292 (Aug. 14, 
2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, 248). 
 91. See Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services-Rescission, 84 
Fed. Reg. 33,732, 33,732 (proposed July 15, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447); 
Sara Rosenbaum, The Latest Installment in the Saga of the Medicaid Equal Access 
Guarantee, Health Aff.: Blog (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/
10.1377/hblog20190820.245433/full [https://perma.cc/RMG7-AHEU]. 
 92. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 
Fed. Reg. 27,846, 27,847–49 (proposed June 14, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 438, 
440, 460). 
 93. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 94. Hinton et al., supra note 4, at 9; see also About Section 1115 Demonstrations, 
Medicaid.gov, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1115-demo/about-1115/
index.html [https://perma.cc/MZ28-48RV] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
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The latter set of CMS decisions culminated in the first work 
requirements95 internal to the Medicaid program, a break from the 
decisions of prior administrations. Work requirements have long been 
part of cash welfare (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) and 
nutritional assistance programming (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Programs), both of which are governed by the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.96 Both programs 
require work effort as a condition of participation for adults who are 
able-bodied, and sanctions for noncompliance extend to program 
exclusion.97 Before Medicaid expansion, however, similar efforts to 
include work requirements in Medicaid programming were rejected by 
CMS.98 This was in part because the populations that were previously 
eligible for Medicaid—children, elderly people, disabled people, and 
pregnant women—have been considered “deserving” regardless of labor 
force participation.99 In states that expanded Medicaid under the ACA, 
however, the program now included a new population of adult 
beneficiaries, including “non-elderly, non-disabled, low-income single 
                                                                                                                           
 95. The term “community engagement requirements” is preferred by CMS and many 
states. See, e.g., 1115 Community Engagement Initiative, Medicaid.gov, https://
www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1115-demo/community-engagement/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/K7PT-MSEZ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). This terminology denotes that 
beneficiaries can fulfill requirements by not only paid work but also volunteering, 
education, job search and training activities, caretaking, and participating in substance use 
treatment. I here use “work requirements” in order to participate in conversation with 
other legal scholars writing about these programs and to echo the discussion of these 
programs in public debate. 
 96. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 824, 110 Stat. 2105, 2323 (adding work requirements to SNAP 
programming); id. § 402, 110 Stat. 2105, 2262 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1612 
(2018)) (adding work requirements to cash welfare programming). 
 97. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Laura D. Hermer, What to Expect When You’re Expecting . . . TANF-Style 
Medicaid Waivers, 27 Annals Health L. 37, 44 & n.41 (2018) [hereinafter Hermer, What to 
Expect]; Letter from Andrew Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to 
Thomas Betlach, Dir., Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.azahcccs.gov/Resources/Downloads/1115Waiver/LetterToState09302016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EKL9-38RH] (disallowing work requirements in Arizona); Letter from 
Marilyn Tavenner, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Michael Hales, 
Deputy Dir., Utah Dep’t of Health (Apr. 6, 2012), https://le.utah.gov/interim/2012/
pdf/00002139.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SJ4-LLC4] (disallowing community service 
requirements in Utah); Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., to Beverly Mackereth, Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (Aug. 18, 2014), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/
downloads/pa/Healthy-Pennsylvania-Private-Coverage-Option-Demonstration/pa-healthy-
ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B8G-2875] (disallowing work requirements in Pennsylvania). 
 99. Huberfeld et al., supra note 79, at 13. 
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adults or couples without children,”100 who have not historically been 
considered deserving without working.101 
In March of 2017, CMS Administrator Seema Verma and then–U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Tom Price issued a 
letter to state governors promising new flexibilities in state waivers, 
including the approval of “innovations that build on the human dignity 
that comes with training, employment, and independence.”102 In January 
of 2018, CMS issued guidelines for state proposals involving community 
engagement requirements for beneficiaries considered able-bodied.103 
These guidelines outline CMS’s hypothesis that mandating individual 
work effort will improve health and alleviate poverty, and they specify 
that CMS will not allow federal Medicaid funds to be spent on “work 
supports” such as transportation or childcare for beneficiaries during 
working hours.104 The Administration’s interest in work effort as a 
condition of benefits participation extends not only to Medicaid but also 
to other federal benefits like federal housing assistance, as President 
Trump has emphasized via executive order.105 
Seventeen states have now sought CMS approval for work require-
ment waivers, of which nine have been granted, with required quotas 
ranging from 80 to 100 hours per month as a condition of maintaining 
Medicaid eligibility.106 Interest in work requirements has been keen in 
states characterized by popular, legislative, or executive resistance to the 
ACA, including nonexpansion states107 and several states that had 
previously used waivers to expand Medicaid in exchange for concessions 
from CMS.108 State applications and CMS approval letters concerning 
work requirements have articulated a range of purposes for these 
                                                                                                                           
 100. Id. at 25. 
 101. The expectation that work effort would identify “deserving” poor dates back to 
the design of Elizabethan poor laws. See id. at 13; see also Hermer, What to Expect, supra 
note 98, at 41. 
 102. Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., & 
Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Governors 2 (Mar. 14, 
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sec-price-admin-verma-ltr.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YQ86-MLR6] [hereinafter Letter to State Governors]. 
 103. Letter from Brian Neale, Deputy Adm’r & Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-
guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR5S-K2LX]. 
 104. Id. at 7. 
 105. Exec. Order No. 13,828, Reducing Poverty in America by Promoting Opportunity 
and Economic Mobility, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,941 (Apr. 13, 2018). 
 106. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Waiver Tracker, supra note 5. 
 107. See David A. Super, A Hiatus in Soft-Power Administrative Law: The Case of 
Medicaid Eligibility Waivers, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 1590, 1600 (2018). 
 108. See Watson, Black Box, supra note 37, at 213; Sidney D. Watson, Premiums and 
Section 1115 Waivers: What Cost Medicaid Expansion?, 9 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 
265, 266 (2016) (describing expansion by § 1115 waiver in Michigan, Arkansas, Indiana, 
and Montana). All four states have since sought work requirement waivers. See Kaiser 
Family Found., Medicaid Waiver Tracker, supra note 5. 
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conditions. These have included alleviating poverty, building dignity, 
promoting state flexibility and tailored programming, advancing national 
economic interests, reverting Medicaid to its pre-ACA intentions, moving 
public beneficiaries into private insurance, controlling costs, promoting 
program sustainability, and “reserving” Medicaid benefits for people who 
are not considered able-bodied.109 
The goal of greatest interest for this Piece is health promotion. All of 
the state applications and CMS approval letters have explicitly argued 
that work requirements will improve beneficiaries’ health—that is, the 
requirements will motivate participation in work or volunteering, which 
will result in employment, which in turn will promote health. In their 
2017 letter to state governors, Administrator Verma and Secretary Price 
                                                                                                                           
 109. For Arizona, see Letter from Andrea J. Casart, Dir., Div. of Medicaid Expansion 
Demonstrations, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Jami Snyder, Dir., Ariz. Health 
Care Cost Containment Sys. (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-
Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/az/az-hccc-ca.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6YS2-7939]. For Arkansas, see Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. 
for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Asa Hutchinson, 
Governor of Ark., & Cindy Gillespie, Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/ar-works-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWB5-B6E9]. 
For Indiana, see Letter from Demetrios Kouzoukas, Principal Deputy Adm’r, Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Allison Taylor, Medicaid Dir., Ind. Family & Soc. Serv. 
Admin. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/
By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-ca.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V4C6-FBXZ]. For Kentucky, see Letter from Paul Mango, Chief 
Principal Deputy Adm’r & Chief of Staff, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Carol H. 
Steckel, Comm’r, Dep’t for Medicaid Servs., Commonwealth of Ky. (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ky/ky-health-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZH4-EJUF]. 
For Michigan, see Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
to Rick Snyder, Governor of Mich., & Kathy Stiffler, Acting Dir., Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., State of Mich. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-
Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/mi/mi-healthy-michigan-
ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FME-FVFC]. For New Hampshire, see Letter from Mary C. 
Mayhew, Deputy Adm’r & Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Henry D. Lipman, 
Medicaid Dir., N.H. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Nov. 30, 2018), https://
www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/
downloads/nh/nh-granite-advantage-health-care-program-ca.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KN8R-SYUK]. For Ohio, see Letter from Andrea J. Casart, Dir., Div. of 
Medicaid Expansion Demonstrations, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Maureen 
Corcoran, Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Medicaid (May 23, 2019), https://www.medicaid.gov/
Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/oh/oh-work-
requirement-community-engagement-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/TVU7-7ZPK]. For Utah, 
see Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Nathan 
Checketts, Dir., Utah Dep’t of Health (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.medicaid.gov/
Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ut/ut-
primary-care-network-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5Z5-KYMH]. For Wisconsin, see Letter 
from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Casey Himebauch, 
Deputy Medicaid Dir. & Adm’r, Div. of Medicaid Servs., Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs. (Oct. 
31, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/
Waivers/1115/downloads/wi/wi-badgercare-reform-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DDD-WVYU]. 
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argued that “[t]he best way to improve the long-term health of low-
income Americans is to empower them with skills and employment.”110 
States have echoed the position that employment brings a “sense of 
accomplishment, personal satisfaction, self-reliance, social interaction, 
and integration”—all of which, states posit, lead to better physical 
health.111 Some states have also used the language of “health 
determinants,” in keeping with CMS’s emphasis on “certain health 
determinants” in waiver programming.112 Across these waivers, states 
have framed employment, or the lack thereof, as a social determinant of 
health, and they seek to remedy unemployment by holding out Medicaid 
as an incentive to motivate individual behavior. 
Commentators have disagreed with the behavioral model behind 
Medicaid work requirements, and some have expressed skepticism about 
states’ and CMS’s intentions in adopting work requirements as a condi-
tion of participation.113 In recent months, observers have also cited the 
experience of Arkansas as cause for concern. Arkansas was the first to 
implement a Medicaid work requirement, which was in force for approx-
imately nine months until the Gresham v. Azar decision vacated the 
program.114 Between June and December 2018, almost 17,000 people were 
notified that they had lost their coverage (estimated to be about 12% of 
the Medicaid population); a statewide representative survey found 
significant decreases in Medicaid coverage, increases in people who 
reported being uninsured, no change in employment, and widespread 
confusion about the policy.115 
Work requirement waivers offer an opportunity to consider broader 
questions about what public health insurance can and should seek to 
                                                                                                                           
 110. Letter to State Governors, supra note 102, at 2. 
 111. State of Kan., KanCare 2.0: Section 1115 Demonstration Renewal Application 9 
(2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/
1115/downloads/ks/ks-kancare-pa3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GT5-LLF6]. 
 112. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 113. See, e.g., Hannah Katch, Jennifer Wagner & Aviva Aron-Dine, Ctr. on Budget & 
Policy Priorities, Taking Medicaid Coverage Away from People Not Meeting Work 
Requirements Will Reduce Low-Income Families’ Access to Care and Worsen Health 
Outcomes (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-8-18health2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R9E2-MTWV]; Laura D. Hermer, Medicaid: Welfare Program of Last 
Resort, or Safety Net?, 44 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 1203, 1224 (2018); Nicole Huberfeld, 
Can Work Be Required in the Medicaid Program?, 375 New Eng. J. Med. 788, 789–90 
(2018); Super, supra note 107, at 1600; Nicholas Bagley & Eli Savit, Michigan’s 
Discriminatory Work Requirements, N.Y. Times (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/08/opinion/michigan-medicaid-work-requirement.html [https://perma.cc/
3YJX-KJZY]; Sara Rosenbaum, Experimenting on the Health of the Poor: Inside Stewart v. 
Azar, Health Aff.: Blog (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20180204.524941/full [https://perma.cc/GD2K-BTQC]. 
 114. 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 115. See Benjamin D. Sommers, Anna L. Goldman, Robert J. Blendon, E. John Orav & 
Arnold M. Epstein, Medicaid Work Requirements: Results from the First Year in Arkansas, 
381 New Eng. J. Med. 1073, 1079–80 (2019). 
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accomplish. In the ensuing litigation, federal courts must now weigh in 
on the purposes of the Medicaid program, with implications that may 
shape future Medicaid programming by both progressive and conserva-
tive states and federal administrations. 
III. PARSING THE PURPOSES OF MEDICAID: STEWART, GRESHAM, AND 
PHILBRICK 
Shortly after CMS approved the first work requirement waiver in 
Kentucky, a group of Medicaid beneficiaries sued to enjoin the 
program.116 Similar suits have challenged waivers in Arkansas,117 New 
Hampshire,118 and Indiana.119 Each complaint named the Secretary of 
HHS, arguing that the Secretary’s approval of each waiver was an abuse 
of discretion under the Social Security Act. Judge James E. Boasberg in 
the District of D.C. has now decided cases concerning all three states, 
reasoning on substantially identical grounds at summary judgment: The 
Secretary’s waiver approvals were indeed arbitrary and capricious, the 
court ruled, because the Secretary had not adequately “considered” the 
extent to which the programs would advance the Medicaid objective of 
furnishing medical assistance.120 These opinions squarely interrogate the 
purposes of the Medicaid statute, and they answer the novel question 
whether statutory goals included the promotion of health alongside the 
purchase of healthcare. 
In each of these decisions, the court has interpreted two provisions 
of the Social Security Act. The first, 42 U.S.C. § 1315, sets out conditions 
for experimental waivers: HHS may approve state experiments, pilots, or 
demonstration programs that “in [the Secretary’s] judgment . . . are 
likely to assist in promoting the [Act’s] objectives.”121 To identify these 
objectives, the court has followed prior precedents in consulting 42 
U.S.C. § 1396-1, which authorizes the appropriation of federal Medicaid 
                                                                                                                           
 116. See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–4, Stewart I, 
313 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-00152), 2018 WL 525491. 
 117. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–4, 
Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-1900 (JEB)), 2018 WL 
8265789. 
 118. See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–4, Philbrick 
v. Azar, No. 1:19-cv-00773 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2019), 2019 WL 3414376. 
 119. See Shari Rudavsky, Lawsuit Is Filed Against Indiana’s Medicaid Work 
Requirements, Indianapolis Star (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/
health/2019/09/25/medicaid-indiana-work-requirements-healthy-indiana-plan-lawsuit-filed-
hhs-trump-administration-cms/2429229001 [https://perma.cc/447S-GKYH]. 
 120. Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *1; Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 131 (D.D.C. 
2019); Gresham, 363 F. Supp. at 169 (D.D.C. 2019); Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 259. 
 121. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 244–45 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012)). Budget 
neutrality is an agency requirement, not a formal statutory requirement. There are 
additional procedural requirements for waivers, including public notice and comment, 
hearings, an evaluation, and a time limitation on waiver periods. See Watson, Black Box, 
supra note 37, at 215. 
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funds “[f]or the purpose of enabling each State . . . to furnish (1) 
medical assistance . . . [to] individuals[ ] whose income and resources 
are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) 
rehabilitation and other services to help such families and individuals 
attain or retain capability for independence or self-care.”122 
The meaning of “furnishing medical assistance” is defined elsewhere 
in the statute as “payment of all or part of the cost” of care,123 and 
precedents in the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court have referred to 
the goal of Medicaid as providing federal money to states that purchase 
medical care on behalf of needy residents.124 The beneficiaries in the 
ACA expansion population—the adults new to Medicaid—indisputably 
qualify as these needy residents. Although the Medicaid expansion is 
optional, states that elect to expand have chosen to include individuals 
below 138% FPL as a mandatory population.125 “As amended,” the court 
in Stewart I explained, “one objective of Medicaid thus became 
‘furnishing medical assistance’ for this new group of low-income 
individuals.”126 The court then identified furnishing medical assistance as 
“a central objective” of the Medicaid Act;127 although the court in each 
case has left the door open for CMS to read in additional purposes, it is 
clear that approving any waiver that is unlikely to advance the “central” 
objective of furnishing medical assistance is beyond the Secretary’s 
discretion.128 
Given the goal of paying for care, the court in each work requirement 
waiver decision has identified the same problem: Although the admini-
strative records showed that reduced Medicaid coverage was a likely 
consequence of each work requirement waiver, there was insufficient 
evidence that the Secretary had considered how those losses would affect 
the objective of furnishing medical assistance for beneficiaries.129 Instead, 
CMS interpreted the Medicaid statute as implying other objectives, and 
the court found that the agency had focused on these objectives as 
                                                                                                                           
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 -1 (Supp. V 2017). 
 123. See id. § 1396d(a); Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 260. 
 124. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1985); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 301 (1980); Adena Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 527 F.3d 176, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2008); 
Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 261. 
 125. See Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *2; Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 132; Gresham, 
363 F. Supp. 3d at 170; Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 261 (“Under the ACA, states can 
choose to expand their Medicaid coverage to include this new, low-income group. Should 
a state choose to do so, those individuals become part of its mandatory population.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 126. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 261. 
 127. Id. at 243, 273 (emphasis added); see also Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *7–8; 
Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 138; Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 176. 
 128. See Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 139; Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 272. 
 129. See Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *8; Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 138; Gresham, 
363 F. Supp. 3d at 177; Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 262. 
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alternatives130 or supplements131 to the goal of furnishing medical assis-
tance. 
CMS’s proffered objectives for the Medicaid program have varied 
somewhat across decisions.132 But by the Stewart II, Gresham, and Philbrick 
decisions, CMS had restated the other objectives as threefold, including 
“advanc[ing] the health and wellness needs” of beneficiaries,133 
promoting beneficiaries’ “financial independence,”134 and “ensur[ing] 
the fiscal sustainability of the Medicaid program.”135 
Although CMS argued in each case that health promotion is a 
secondary or even overriding purpose of Medicaid,136 the district court 
firmly decided that CMS may not “conflate[]” the general goal of 
improving health with the specific goal of furnishing medical assistance: 
“[F]ocus[ing] on health is no substitute for considering Medicaid’s 
central concern: covering health costs. While improving public health 
and health outcomes might be one consequence of ‘furnishing . . . medical 
assistance,’ the Secretary cannot choose his own means to that end.”137 
The court emphasized Congress’s focus on the high costs of care at the 
time of the ACA—it is, after all, the Affordable Care Act—and noted that 
insofar as health promotion is a goal, it may only be pursued through 
Congress’s chosen pathway of purchasing healthcare for the low-income 
population.138 Indeed, the court went further to say that recognizing a 
separate health promotion rationale for Medicaid could have “bizarre 
results” in waiver approvals: 
[I]magine that the Secretary could exercise his waiver authority 
solely to promote health, rather than cover healthcare costs. 
Nothing could stop him from conditioning Medicaid coverage on 
consuming more broccoli (at least on an experimental basis). Or, 
as Plaintiffs suggest, he might force all recipients to enroll in 
                                                                                                                           
 130. See Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *8; Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 176; Stewart I, 
313 F. Supp. 3d at 268. 
 131. See Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *11; Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 139. 
 132. In Stewart I, the Secretary offered other objectives such as “address[ing] 
behavioral and social factors that influence health outcomes,” “incentiviz[ing] 
beneficiaries to engage in their own health care,” and “facilitat[ing] smoother beneficiary 
transition to commercial coverage.” Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 261–62. 
 133. Id. at 266. 
 134. Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 139. 
 135. Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *4; Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 180. 
 136. See Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *11; Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 179; Stewart I, 
313 F. Supp. 3d at 144. 
 137. Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 266. 
 138. Id. at 267 (“Had Congress maintained a singular focus on promoting health, it 
easily could have said as much, but the text and structure of Medicaid shows its desire to 
provide health coverage to those groups. After all, the Act does not convert states into 
hospitals, forcing them to provide [] medical services.”). 
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pilates classes or take certain nutritional supplements. . . . The 
penalty for non-compliance? No more Medicaid.139 
In light of the specific waiver terms at issue in Stewart, Gresham, and 
Philbrick, it is easy to see why the court’s imagination ran toward other 
waiver terms that would impose behavioral conditions on program 
eligibility—all three cases concerned programs that made working, study-
ing, or volunteering a condition of program participation.140 But at least 
in this series of cases, the court has not considered other forms of inno-
vation that may be undertaken by states willing and able to spend more. 
Moreover, the court has done little to imagine other waiver designs, 
including possible progressive efforts to improve social determinants of 
health. 
Oral arguments before the D.C. Circuit in Stewart and Gresham 
focused heavily on the purposes of the Medicaid statute,141 with questions 
from all three panel judges suggesting that coverage is the “critical” or 
“principal” program goal.142 Although goals such as health promotion 
may be “laudable,” in the words of Judge David Sentelle, there were 
questions about whether these objectives should “outweigh” the goal of 
coverage.143 Judge Cornelia Pillard echoed the district court’s concern 
about other behavioral conditions on coverage, posing a hypothetical 
waiver that would condition Medicaid coverage on watching only 
minimal hours of television.144 Conditions on eligibility, again, were top 
of the judges’ minds when imagining the types of waivers that might be 
justified in health promotion terms. The D.C. Circuit has yet to rule, and 
its ruling may shed light on whether health promotion may serve as an 
additional program goal. 
Under Stewart, Gresham, and Philbrick, CMS could, assuming budget 
neutrality, continue to approve waivers designed to promote health by 
alleviating structural risk factors. But there may be new pitfalls for these 
types of programs. Imagine, for example, that a state sought a waiver to 
reduce the risk of lead poisoning in families with Medicaid coverage, 
such as by using funds to finance improvements to housing and water 
supply for Medicaid beneficiaries. Depending on cost and design, a 
waiver like this would fall into one of three categories. 
                                                                                                                           
 139. Id. at 267–68 (citation omitted). 
 140. See Philbrick, 2019 WL 3414376, at *1; Stewart II, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125, 130 (D.D.C. 
2019); Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 172; Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 243. 
 141.  Oral Argument, Gresham v. Azar, No. 19-5094 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2019), Stewart 
v. Azar, No. 19-5095 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/
recordings2019.nsf/2FEFECFB798E422C85258490005718BA/$file/19-5095.mp3 
[https://perma.cc/WDU8-NDL2]. 
 142. See Amy Goldstein, Appeals Panel Expresses Skepticism About Medicaid Work 
Requirements, Wash. Post (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/
appeals-panel-expresses-skepticism-about-medicaid-work-requirements/2019/10/11/
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 144. Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 26:50–27:10. 
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First, a waiver seeking to reduce lead poisoning may increase the 
furnishing of medical assistance. If so, approval of such a waiver by the 
Secretary of HHS would easily pass muster under Stewart. And indeed, 
where beneficiaries receive other types of support, they may be better 
able to access medical assistance. Purchasing transportation and child-
care assistance specifically for attending medical care appointments, for 
example, is justifiable on these grounds, and Medicaid already covers 
nonemergency medical transportation in many states.145 Perhaps families 
less vulnerable to lead poisoning are better able to secure other types of 
care. But this argument at best advances an indirect benefit of what these 
waivers would actually aim to do, which is to promote the health of 
beneficiaries by means other than the purchase of medical care. 
Second, the hypothetical lead poisoning waiver could have no effect on 
furnishing medical assistance. If so, the waiver may still be approvable—but 
it may be difficult. In Stewart, Gresham, and Philbrick, the administrative 
records for the waivers projected coverage losses; perhaps the Secretary 
could approve waivers that increase spending on social determinants in 
the name of health promotion so long as they have a neutral impact on 
coverage. The statutory standard for approval, however, is that Medicaid 
waivers must be “likely to advance” the purposes of the statute. If these 
purposes must always—and perhaps must only—include the furnishing 
of medical assistance, Medicaid waivers will lose some of the flexibility 
needed to support innovation from both sides of the political spectrum. 
Appellate decisions in the Stewart, Gresham, and Philbrick cases may shed 
light on whether programs that promote health with neutral impacts on 
coverage may continue. 
Third, the imagined lead poisoning waiver could reduce the furnishing 
of medical assistance. This may occur if, for example, the state chose to 
refrain from coverage for optional benefits, or if the program put in 
place protocols to limit overtreatment146 or coverage for “low-value 
care.”147 Under Stewart, a waiver that undermines the furnishing of 
medical assistance will not stand, even if it results in net improvements in 
public health outcomes. Perhaps this is as it should be—if Congress 
wishes to limit lead poisoning, it could do so by means other than 
Medicaid waiver, and a decision to let this waiver stand would indeed 
                                                                                                                           
 145. Medicaid & CHIP Payment & Access Comm’n, Medicaid Coverage of  
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allow the health promotion rationale to outweigh the coverage goal. But 
public health problems often affect communities with comparatively less 
political power. Lead poisoning from paint and water is an ideal example—
there has been vanishingly little political action on lead poisoning, in 
large part because the people most at risk are low-income children of 
color. Where political will and resources are not forthcoming, waivers 
would provide an alternative pathway to accomplish public health goals, 
and investing in social determinants such as safe housing may in fact 
purchase more health than some investments in care. 
Other forms of § 1115 waivers might redraw coverage lines, 
eliminating coverage for some treatments or benefits in order to ensure 
access to care with greater impact. Since 1994, for example, Oregon has 
held a § 1115 waiver to cover Medicaid benefits according to a Prioritized 
List,148 where a line is drawn between covered and noncovered benefits 
based on health benefit and category of care.149 This approach 
necessarily eliminates the possibility of coverage for some treatments (for 
example, routine foot care for those not at risk of amputation; infertility 
treatments; repair of uncomplicated hernias150), but it ensures that funds 
spent on furnishing medical assistance are allocated to maximize the 
program’s impact on health. A Secretary reviewing this type of waiver 
may decide that it has no impact on furnishing medical assistance, or 
perhaps that it increases assistance if it adds services that were not already 
covered (such as bone marrow transplants, which were excluded before 
the waiver’s adoption151). But if it is possible to interpret this waiver as 
reducing medical assistance for those in need of the excluded benefits, 
the health promotion rationale is an important additional justification. 
Commentators have long hoped that states may consider invoking 
§ 1115 waivers to address structural determinants of health.152 As Part I 
noted, some states have come closer than others in doing so. But under 
the Stewart line of cases, a narrow purpose of Medicaid may limit not only 
stick-based waiver terms such as work requirements as a condition of 
eligibility but also carrot-based waivers and the direct purchase of services 
that alleviate structural risk factors.153 States attentive to the Stewart cases 
                                                                                                                           
 148. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Oregon Demonstration Factsheet 4–5 (Jan. 
12, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/
Waivers/1115/downloads/or/or-health-plan2-fs.pdf [https://perma.cc/85KJ-V4JM]. 
 149. Prioritized List Overview, Or. Health Auth., https://www.oregon.gov/oha/HPA/
DSI-HERC/Pages/Prioritized-List-Overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/8H6F-XW5K] (last 
updated Jan. 2, 2018). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Philip A. Perry & Timothy Hotze, Oregon’s Experiment with Prioritizing 
Public Health Care Services, 13 Virtual Mentor 241, 241 (2011), https://
journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.ama-assn.org/files/2018-06/pfor1-
1104.pdf [https://perma.cc/R75T-V57R]. 
 152. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 153. Those concerned about all behavioral conditions on Medicaid eligibility (for 
example, work requirements, premiums, wellness activities) may find this an acceptable 
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may be reluctant to design waivers primarily geared toward health 
promotion, even if the latter goals may be more efficient and impactful 
uses of funds. 
IV. THE FUTURE ROLE OF PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE 
Given the spectacularly high costs of U.S. healthcare,154 it is perhaps 
enough for public insurance programs like Medicaid and Medicare to 
purchase healthcare services. There are always more benefits to add, 
more technologies to cover, and more people who could qualify for 
coverage for states with the desire to spend more in state funds. But to 
focus exclusively on purchasing healthcare services misses a novel 
opportunity to use Medicaid § 1115 waivers to intervene productively in 
social determinants—which may lead to greater improvements in health 
than merely paying for care. 
Chilling health promotion programming in Medicaid raises 
concerns, in part because the country’s largest public insurance program 
could be a powerful vehicle for improving public health. Medicaid is vast 
in scope, covering “traditional” populations in all fifty states and 
expansion adults in thirty-three.155 Although state § 1115 waivers can at 
most extend statewide, recent experiences with state waivers have 
revealed rapid diffusion across states, where new states look to prior 
waivers as having near-precedential effects on what innovations should be 
approved. The Trump Administration has entrenched this dynamic by 
promising to expedite future approvals of any § 1115 waiver terms that 
have been approved in the past. This may not be ideal for a mechanism 
intended to promote innovative experimentation, but it does lend itself 
                                                                                                                           
outcome. But rather than chilling all waivers (even uniformly), CMS and the courts could 
use other steps to narrow approval to only meritorious proposals, including rigorous 
evaluations of experimental programs and increased CMS willingness to deny renewal or 
insist on modifications. Courts could also place more emphasis on whether the Secretary 
has permissibly found that a program is “likely to advance” program goals on the basis of 
the administrative record, rather than narrowing the program goals themselves. Under the 
current standard, the Secretary must “examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made.” Stewart I, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 249 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 154. See Bradley & Taylor, supra note 21, at 1–20; Elisabeth Rosenthal, An American 
Sickness: How Healthcare Became Big Business and How You Can Take It Back 1–8 
(2018); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Paying Till It Hurts, N.Y. Times: Health, https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/health/paying-till-it-hurts.html 
[https://perma.cc/K5SZ-D25T] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
 155. See supra notes 1, 82 and accompanying text. An additional two million 
otherwise-eligible adults would be covered had their state chosen to expand coverage. See 
Rachel Garfield, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, Kaiser Family Found., The Coverage 
Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid 2 (2019), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-The-Coverage-Gap-Uninsured-Poor-Adults-in-
States-that-Do-Not-Expand-Medicaid [https://perma.cc/MW8A-VUJM]. 
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well to the diffusion of programmatic terms that prove to be effective. 
States that propose health promotion waivers—and that find such waivers 
to be successful, ideally through methodologically rigorous independent 
evaluations156—can provide models for other jurisdictions where 
populations face similar risk factors for ill health. Congress could also use 
state waiver experiences as models for national legislation or 
modifications to Medicaid terms. 
Medicaid could also be a valuable vehicle for health promotion for 
several reasons. First, Medicaid receives open-ended federal funding 
instead of block grants or state grants with per-capita caps,157 giving the 
program more financial flexibility than insurance programs with more 
limited funding, such as the State Children’s Health Insurance Program. 
Medicaid also explicitly contains mechanisms to encourage experimen-
tation, including § 1115 waivers and § 1332 waivers, which leverage not 
only Medicaid funds but also federal tax subsidies under the Affordable 
Care Act.158 This explicit call for experimentation not only encourages states 
to develop more innovative public health approaches but also allows 
states to diverge from one another to focus on individually pressing 
health problems.159 
Finally, Medicaid experimentation provides an opportunity to obtain 
federal matching funds for public health approaches that have not yet 
attracted political will in Congress. Although there are federal programs 
that aim to address some of the determinants described above—SNAP, 
                                                                                                                           
 156. See Kristen Underhill, Atheendar Venkataramani & Kevin G. Volpp, Fulfilling 
States’ Duty to Evaluate Medicaid Waivers, 379 New Eng. J. Med. 1985, 1986–87 (2018) 
(suggesting the use of randomized, controlled trials to strengthen approved Section 1115 
waiver evaluations, which are “essential in order for such experiments to yield useful 
lessons for Medicaid program design”). 
 157. See Rachel Sachs & Nicole Huberfeld, The Problematic Law and Policy of 
Medicaid Block Grants, Health Aff.: Blog (July 24, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20190722.62519/full/ [https://perma.cc/3GMC-QE2Q]. 
 158. Section 1332 waivers provide states flexibility to waive out of certain Affordable 
Care Act requirements for a five-year period and reallocate the funds that would have 
been provided for activities such as maintaining the marketplaces or tax subsidies for 
private insurance purchases. See 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (Supp. V 2017); Tracking Section 1332 
State Innovation Waivers, Kaiser Family Found. (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.kff.org/
health-reform/fact-sheet/tracking-section-1332-state-innovation-waivers [https://perma.cc/
8YNE-3Q2C]. Thus far, states have generally used these waivers for reinsurance 
mechanisms to stabilize ACA markets. 
 159. For example, twenty-eight states have now received approval for waivers targeting 
the opioid epidemic, with innovations such as expanding access to medication-assisted 
treatment and lifting federal restrictions on the size of inpatient facilities for mental and 
behavioral health. See, e.g., 1115 Substance Use Disorder Demonstrations, Medicaid.gov, 
https://www.medicaid.gov/state-resource-center/innovation-accelerator-program/
program-areas/reducing-substance-use-disorders/1115-sud-demonstrations/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/4G3K-QEBS] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019); Section 1115 Waivers for 
Substance Use Disorder Treatment, Medicaid & CHIP Payment & Access Comm’n, 
https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/section-1115-waivers-for-substance-use-disorder-
treatment [https://perma.cc/7YV4-NCF8] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
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TANF, the Earned Income Tax Credit, LIHEAP, federal housing assis-
tance, and federal student loans—many low-income individuals eligible 
for Medicaid struggle with problems of food insecurity,160 energy 
insecurity,161 homelessness and poor housing,162 and other disadvantages 
linked to poverty. It may be politically challenging to expand on any of 
these programs, or to develop new federal programs with separate line 
items. But if state Medicaid programs can demonstrate possible advantages 
in paying to alleviate broader risk factors for poor health, these waivers may 
be practicable means of receiving federal assistance in achieving public 
health goals without requiring Congressional modifications.163 
Despite these potential advantages, however, states have done little 
to date to pursue the types of public health promotion waivers suggested 
above. This reluctance may stem from multiple sources including a lack 
of state funds, disagreement over how to prioritize and approach public 
health goals, uncertainty about how best to intervene in social and 
structural risk factors, the budget-neutrality requirement at CMS for § 1115 
waivers,164 and possible uncertainty about the authority of HHS to approve 
waivers for novel types of expenditure.165 None of these sources of 
uncertainty would be fatal to social determinants waivers, including those 
pursued under § 1115 or DSRIP programming. But the Stewart line of 
cases may add a nationwide roadblock to such waivers, casting doubt on 
the extent to which waivers justified in health-promotion terms may be 
eligible for approval without also expanding the direct purchase of 
medical assistance. 
                                                                                                                           
 160. See New Research Collaboration Yields Insights into Food Insecurity Among 
Medicaid Beneficiaries, Root Cause Coal. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.rootcausecoalition.org/
e_news/new-research-collaboration-yields-insights-into-food-insecurity-among-medicaid-
beneficiaries/ [https://perma.cc/4TWM-WQKD]. 
 161. See Daniel R. Taylor, Bruce A. Bernstein, Eileen Carroll, Elizabeth Oquendo, 
Linda Peyton & Lee M. Pachter, Keeping the Heat on for Children’s Health: A Successful 
Medical-Legal Partnership Initiative to Prevent Utility Shutoffs in Vulnerable Children, 26 
J. Health Care for Poor & Underserved 676, 682–83 (2015) (working primarily in a 
population eligible for Medicaid and finding high levels of energy insecurity). 
 162. See Alley et al., supra note 78, at 10; Joshua Bamberger, Reducing Homelessness 
by Embracing Housing as a Medicaid Benefit, 176 JAMA Internal Med. 1051, 1051 (2016). 
 163. State experimentation in this area could eventually build momentum for changes 
to federal Medicaid policy; in healthcare, the use of Massachusetts as a model for the ACA 
private market reforms is one such example of the federal government looking to states 
for inspiration. See Sharon K. Long, Karen Stockley & Heather Dahlen, Massachusetts 
Health Reforms: Uninsurance Remains Low, Self-Reported Health Status Improves as 
State Prepares to Tackle Costs, 31 Health Aff. 444, 449–50 (2012). 
 164. This has been interpreted as requiring each component of a § 1115 waiver to 
demonstrate budget neutrality for the federal government. See Hill, Budget Neutrality 
Policy Letter, supra note 37, at 2. This means that even if savings accrue across an entire 
set of waiver terms, individual waiver terms that are not budget neutral may be difficult to 
justify. 
 165. See supra notes 38–40. 
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Besides Medicaid, other public assistance programs aim to “furnish 
medical assistance,” and we might ask similar questions about whether 
the federal government could seek to pay for social and structural-level 
interventions in Medicare, the Indian Health Services, TRICARE and the 
VA, and other federal benefits programs. To date, with the exception of 
some covered benefits in Medicare Advantage plans (for example, trans-
portation, meal services, and connection to social services166), Medicare has 
done little to mobilize federal funds for broader risk factors. The 2020 
election has galvanized discussions about Medicare for All (M4A), with 
multiple permutations of how Medicare might be expanded to accom-
modate all U.S. residents as a single-payer plan, or perhaps cover only 
those not covered by employer-sponsored insurance, or perhaps offer a 
public option or early buy-in.167 All of these plans, however, focus on ways 
of purchasing care from providers and manufacturers, and they have not 
turned the discussion to intervening in upstream social determinants of 
health. Like Medicaid, Medicare has an open-ended budget and statutory 
avenues for innovation; more expansive thinking about Medicare and 
social determinants could yield better returns to health than paying for 
care alone. 
To be sure, purchasing care alone is daunting in the most expensive 
healthcare market in the world. But to date, the United States has lacked 
the political will and the creativity to address the social and structural-
level risk and protective factors that shape our health outcomes—and 
that put us near the bottom of our peer group in international health 
rankings.168 Reframing public health insurance as a means of addressing 
                                                                                                                           
 166. See CMS Finalizes Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment and Policy Updates 
to Maximize Competition and Coverage, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Apr. 1, 
2019), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-finalizes-medicare-advantage-
and-part-d-payment-and-policy-updates-maximize-competition-and 
[https://perma.cc/44UJ-4R3F]; Paige Minemyer, Experts: Offering Medicare Advantage 
Supplemental Benefits Is “A Long Play,” FierceHealthcare (Sept. 10, 2019), https://
www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/experts-offering-medicare-advantage-supplemental-
benefits-a-long-play [https://perma.cc/H82G-EC2C]. 
 167. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough & Trip Gabriel, ‘Medicare for All’ vs. ‘Public Option’: 
The 2020 Field Is Split, Our Survey Shows, N.Y. Times (June 23, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/us/politics/2020-democrats-medicare-for-all-
public-option.html [https://perma.cc/SD37-KV97] (summarizing plan ideas among 
Democratic presidential candidates); Dylan Scott, On Health Care, There Are 3 Types of 
Democrats Running for President, Vox (July 30, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/
7/30/20747974/democratic-debate-health-care-medicare-for-all [https://perma.cc/RC2X-
FQJD]; see also Linda J. Blumberg, John Holahan, Matthew Buettgens, Anuj 
Gangopadhyaya, Bowen Garrett, Adele Shartzer, Michael Simpson, Robin Wang, Melissa 
M. Favreault & Diane Arnos, Comparing Health Insurance Reform Options: From 




 168. See Karen Davis, Kristof Stremikis, David Squires & Cathy Schoen, 
Commonwealth Fund, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: How the Performance of the U.S. Health 
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social determinants of health may sound like a tall order, but states have 
begun to make inroads into using Medicaid for this purpose, and the 
lessons learned in Medicaid may be useful for other public benefits 
programs as well. To cultivate these efforts, we may need to take a more 
inclusive view of the purposes and capacity of public health insurance.169 
CONCLUSION 
In light of Medicaid’s scope, open-ended budgetary allocation, and 
built-in flexibilities for state waiver approaches, the time is ripe for more 
ambitious Medicaid § 1115 waivers that target social determinants of 
health. But just as such waivers are gaining traction, they may be 
impeded by decisions that exclude health promotion from acceptable 
Medicaid purposes. The Stewart line of cases has important implications 
on several fronts, and although many commentators have focused on the 
implications for work requirement waivers, these cases may have broader 
consequences for efforts to use Medicaid as a means of public health 
promotion. Medicaid has unique advantages as an avenue for addressing 
social determinants of health, and truncating Medicaid’s purposes may 
affect not only waivers that set conditions on eligibility but also waivers 
that reallocate resources to tackle upstream causes of poor health. 
Public health scientists are continuing to build evidence that demon-
strates how social and structural factors influence health. Where there 
are neither the funds nor the will to address these problems in new 
legislation or federal programming, Medicaid waivers could provide a 
promising vehicle for action. But these waivers may become less 
appealing, and less tenable, in light of judicial decisions that narrow the 
purposes of the program. 
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